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I . INTRODUCTION 
In just a few months, we wil l be celebrating the fift ieth anniversary or the 
passage of the Ohio Laws Against Discrimination and the creation of the Ohio Civil 
Rights Commission. As we look back on tive decades of robust enforcement of the 
state's civil rights laws, however, it is ironic that the future-at least in so far as it 
relates to fa ir housing- has been called into question by a series of state court 
decisions narrowly interpreting various provisions relating directly or indirectly to 
the enforcement of the state's fai r housing law. Although the Ohio Civil Rights 
Commission and its partners throughout the state have always prided themselves on 
being leaders in fa ir housing enforcement and related initiatives, they now face the 
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real possibility that the protections and remedies afforded under the state's fair 
housing law will fall below the standards set forth in the federal Fair Housing Act. 1 
This article reviews these recent court decisions and discusses their potential 
impact on the continued certification of the state's fair housing law as ''substantially 
equivalent." It also addresses several responsive steps being taken by the Oh io Civil 
Rights Commission in order to re-establish the rights and responsibilities under the 
state's fair housing law. 
II. THE MEANING AND IMPORTANCE OF "SUBSTANTIAL EQUJVALF.Ncy'· 
In fair housing circles, the phrase "substantial equivalency"' is readily understood 
to mean the designation afforded by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development to state laws that afford same or similar protections as the fede ral Fair 
Housing Act.~ In order to be certified as substantial ly equivalent, lhe state fair 
housing law must provide--both on its face and in operation- "rights, procedures. 
remedies, and the availability of judicial review that are substantially equi va lent to 
those provided in the federal Fair Housing Act."3 Moreover. after a ::;tate law is 
certified as substantially equivalent. there is a 5-ycar renewal process to ensure 
continuing substantial equ ivalency,4 and any changes limiting the effectiveness of a 
state's lair housing law may result in the need to take corrective action to maintain 
the substantial equivalency certification.5 
Of course, amongst state and local agencies across the country. substantial 
equivalency means something of equal importance in these trying economic times-
eligibility for federal funding. Interestingly enough, substantial equ ivalency was the 
basis for the last major revision to Ohio's fair housing law in 1992.A Although 
unusual in a state ordinari ly lacking any detailed legislative history, the intent 
underlying this legislative enactment was extraordinarily clear.7 The l egislati~m. 
House Bill 321, was declared to be an emergency measure necessary for the 
immediate preservation or the public peace, health and satety, and stated that 
"immediate action is required in order for Ohio's Fair Housing Law to achieve 
substantial equivalency with the federal Fair Housing Act."~ This legislation 
likewise stated that not amending the state's fair housing law would result in a 
withdrawal of certification of substantial equivalence "and a loss of eligibility for at 
least $700,000 in federal funds for fair housing investigation and enforcement in 
Ohio."'~ 
142 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2006). 
224 C.F.R. § 115.201 (2009). 
324 C.F.R. § 115.20 I. For a detailed discussion of the criteria for detennining the 
adequacy of a state's fair housing law, see 24 C.F.R. § 11 5.204. 
424 C.F.R. § 115.208(a). 
524 C.F.R. § 115.2JJ(b). 
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If there were any doubt about the reach of the state's fair housing law or the 
degree to which it seeks to prohibit unlawful discriminatory housing practices, 
House Bill 321 would appear to provide a definitive answer. There could be no 
stronger evidence of a legislative intent to ensure that fair housing provisions of Ohio 
Revised Code Chapter 4112 provide the same protections and remedies afforded 
under the federal fair housing law than this clear legislative pronouncement. 
Ill. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN OHIO'S FAIR HOUSING LAW 
Since its initial designation as substantially equivalent, there have been few 
reasons to seriously re-examine Ohio's fair housing law or question whether it 
afforded the same protections and remedies as its federal counterpart. While some 
applications of the law have given rise to spirited debate, 111 the courts' interpretations 
of the law, for the most part, have remained consistent with interpretations of the 
federal Fair Housing Act. 11 
Despite nearly two decades of relative calm on the substantial equivalency issue, 
however, this past year proved the old adage, ··when it rains, it pours." In a span of 
less than one year, state courts issued not one, but four decisions interpreting the 
state fair housing law in a manner that threatens the certification of the state's fair 
housing law as substantially equivalent. 12 
A. A Landlord's Liability.for Tenant on Tenant Harassment 
In Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Akron Metropolitan Housing Authority." the 
issue was whether a landlord could be held liable for failing to take corrective action 
against a tenant who engaged in racially harassing conduct of another le::nant and 
created a hostile housing environment. The Supreme Court of Ohio began its 
analysis with the unremarkable assessment that "R.C. 4112.02(H)(4) does not 
expressly recognize a cause of action against a landlord who fails to take corrective 
action in response to the creation of a hostile housing environment by one of his 
10See, e.g .. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Harlett , 724 N.E.2d 1242. 1246 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1999) (holding that the use of the phrase "mature adults only" in a rental advertisement was 
·•ambiguous language" and did not establish a violation of the prohibition against 
discriminatory advertising set forth in R.C. § 4112.02(H)(7) which makes it an unlawful 
discriminatory practice for any person to "[p ]rint, publish. or circulate any statement or 
advertisement, or make or cause to be made any statement or advertisement. relating to the 
sale, transfer, assignment. rental. lease, sublease, or acquisition of any housing 
accommodations, . .. that indicates any preference. limitation, specitication, or discrimination 
based upon . . . familial status"). 
11See, e.g. , Shoenfelt v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 663 N.E.2d 13:'i3. 1356 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1995) (holding that punitive damages are appropriate in a fair housing discrirnination 
case, absent a showing of malice, because "the overriding purpose that governs such an award 
is that the damages serve the purpose of deterring the accused trom engaging in future 
discrimination"). 
12See Ohio Civil Rights Comm' n v. Akron Metro. How;. Auth .• 892 N. E.2d 415 (Ohio 
2008); Ohio ex rei. Am. Legion Post 25 v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm 'n, 884 N.E.2d 589 (Ohio 
2008); Ohio Civil Rights Comm 'n v. Fairmark Dev., Inc. , No. 08AP-250. 2008 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 5400 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. I I. 2008); Chance v. Fair Hous. Advocates Assoc., No. 
07CA0016, 2008 Ohio App. LEX IS 2210 (Ohio Ct. App. June 2, 2008). 
13892 N.E.2d at 416. 
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tenants[,]" but rather "provides only that it is an unlawful discriminatory practice for 
any person to '[d)iscriminate against any person in the terms or conditions of selling, 
transferring, assigning, renting, leasing, or subleasing any housing accommodations 
or in furnishing facilities, services, or privileges in connection with the ownership, 
occupancy, or use of any housing accommodations ... because of race. "'14 
Next, the Supreme Court of Ohio turned to the dearth of case law with respect to 
finding a hostile housing environment. The Court, however, rejected five of the 
cited federal court decisions because the claims involved harassment by the 
defendant, either directly or indirectly,15 and rejected the remaining federal court's 
decision interpreting another state's fair housing law as "unconvincing."' ~ 
Finding no persuasive authority on the issue presented, the Supreme Court 
examined whether the hostile environment case law developed in the employment 
context could be applied to cases arising in the housing context.17 While 
acknowledging that employers were liable for workplace harassment by 
nonsupervisory coworkers that they "knew or should have known" about, the Court 
cautioned that this liability "derives from the established principles of agency law. " 18 
"The agency principles that govern employer-employee liabi li ty have no parallel in 
the context of landlord-tenant disputes[,]" the Court explained.'<) '"The relation of 
landlord and tenant in itself involves no idea of representation or of agency. It is a 
relation existing between two independent contracting parties. The landlord is not 
responsible to third persons for the to11s of his tenant. "'20 
The Supreme Court then observed that "[t)he amount of control that a landlord 
exercises over his tenant is not comparable to that which an employer exercises over 
14/d. at 417- 18 (quoting R.C. § 41 I 2.02(H)(4) (alteration in original)). The Ohio Supreme 
Court specifically distinguished this case from a situation in which "a tenant alleges that the 
landlord or building supervisor created a hostile housing environment through his own 
harassment of the tenant[,]" stressing that it was not deciding whether such a cause of action 
existed under the state's fair housing law. /d. at 417. 
15See DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d I 004, 1006 (7th Cir. 1996) (claim of direct harassment 
by landlord of tenant); Honce v. Vigil, I F.3d I 085, I 087-l.l8 (I Oth Cir. 1993) (same): Halprin 
v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass·n, 388 F.3d 327, 328 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(claims of direct harassment by a homeowners' association, its members, and a corporation 
that acted in cooperation with the association); Smith v. Mission Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 225 F. 
Supp. 2d 1293, 1297 (D. Kan. 2002) (claim if direct harassment by landlord oftenant). See 
also Neudecker v. Boisclair Corp., 351 F.3d 361 , 362-63 (8th Cir. 2003) (claim of harassment 
by building managers and the children of building managers). 
16See Bradley v . Carydale Enters., 707 F. Supp. 217 ( E.D. Va. 1989) (holding that 
toleration by the building owner. manager, and employees of harassment of tenants by other 
tenants was actionable under the Virginia fair housing law); Akron Metro Hous. Awhs .. 892 
N.E.2d at 418. 
17Akron Metro Hous. Auths .. 892 N.E.2d at 419. 
18/d. at 418- 19 (citing Hampel v. Food Ingredients Specialties, Inc. , 729 N.E.2d 726. 732 
(Ohio 2000)). 
19/d. at419. 
20/d. at 419-20 (quoting Midland Oil Co. v. Thigpen, 4 F.2d 85. 91 (8th Cir. 1924)). 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss2/6
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his employee."21 While a landlord has the ability to evict tenants, the Court 
concluded that "[t]he power of eviction alone ... is insufficient to hold a landlord 
liable for his tenant's tortious actions against another tenant."~2 For these reasons, 
the Supreme Court of Ohio held that a landlord may not be held liable under the 
state's fair housing law for failing to take corrective action against a tenant whose 
racial harassment of another tenant created a hostile housing environment.23 
B. Preventative Relief and Rerrofitting Inaccessible Housing 
One of the most perplexing problems facing both governmental and private 
enforcement efforts to address the design and construction of multifamily dwellings 
not accessible to persons with disabilities is the statute of limitations. Generally 
speaking, under both state and federal law, newly designed and constmcted covered 
multifamily dwellings must be designed and constTucted so as to be readily 
accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities.24 Not surprisingly, the 
violations in these cases are often discovered more than one year after construction is 
completed, occupancy permits are issued, or the last individual unit is sold, thus 
presenting a timeliness problem.25 In Ohio, state trial and appellate courts have 
rejected nearly every argument presented in response to the statute of limitations 
problem posed by the latency of design and construction violations.26 
The one argument that has succeeded, at least in part, is that the State of Ohio is 
not subject to the one year statute of limitations when it brings a civil action pursuant 
to R.C. § 4112.052 to protect fair housing rights.27 This section provides that: 
Whenever the Ohio civil rights commission has reasonable cause to 
believe that any person or persons are engaged in a pattern or practice of 
resistance to a person or persons' full enjoyment of the rights granted by 
[R.C. § 41l2.02(H)], or that any group of persons has been denied any of 
the rights granted by that division and the denial raises an issue of public 
21 /d. at 420. 
22Akron Metro Hous. Auths., 892 N.E.2d at 420. 
23/d. 
~4See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(C) (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(H)(22) 
(LexisNexis 2009). A covered multifamily dwelling is defined as "buildings consisting of 4 or 
more units if such buildings have one or more elevators ... and ground Ooor units in other 
buildings consisting of 4 or more units." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(7); see also Owo REV. CODE 
ANN. § 4112.02(H)(22) (including a definition of covered multifamily dwelling similar to 
federal law). 
25See, e.g., Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Triangle Real Estate Servs .. No. 06AP-157, 2007 
Ohio App. LEXIS 1639, *23-24 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2007); Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. 
Fairmark Dev., Inc., No. 08AP-250, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 5400, *2-5 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 
II. 2008). 
26See. e.g., Triangle Real Esrate Servs., 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 1639, at *15-27 (holding 
that neither the continuing violation theory, the discovery rule, nor public policy 
considerations extended the statute of limitations in a case involving noncompliance with 
design and construction requirements). 
27 Fairmark Dev .. Inc .. 2008 Ohio App. LEXlS 5400. at * 12. 
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importance, the commission may refer the matter to the attorney general 
for commencement of a civil action in a court of common pleas. The 
attorney general may seek any preventive relief considered necessary to 
ensure the full enjoyment of the rights granted by that division, including 
a permanent or temporary injunction or temporary restraining order.28 
In Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Fairmark Development, lnc.,29 the Tenth 
District Court of Appeals held that R.C. § 4112.052 "sets forth no time limitations on 
OCRC's ability to seek the authorized relicf."30 Recognizing that a civil action under 
R.C. § 4112.052 "is distinct from other causes of action under R.C. Chapter 41 12 in 
that R.C. § 4112.052 was primarily designed to redress public wrongs, unlike other 
provisions in the chapter that are primarily designed to redress individual wrongs[,]" 
the court reasoned that ''R.C. 41 12.052 need not be construed with other statutes, 
including those that contain a limitations period." 31 Consequently, the court held: 
[A)s in the analogous federal law that authorizes preventive and injunctive 
relief for public wrongs involving unlawful discriminatory practices, 
Ohio's legislature did not impose a time limit on OCRC in seeking 
preventive relief under R.C. 4112.052. Had the General Assembly 
intended to limit the period within which a civil action must be 
commenced and relief sought under R.C. 4112.052, it could have 
specifically done so, as it did in other sections of R.C. Chapter 4112.32 
The court, however, went on to address a related issue-whether the preventative 
relief authorized under R.C. § 41 I 2.052 included "injunctive relief in the form of 
[contribution] to a monetary fund for the purpose of retrofitting the inaccessible 
features . . . [or] by requiring retrofitting necessary to bring [inaccessible 
multifamily dwellings] into compliance .... "33 While agreeing "that, when 
authorized and available as a remedy, retrofitting is a particularly appropriate remedy 
to remove the lingering effects of past discriminatory practices that have violated the 
rights of disabled persons to accessible housing[.)" the court nonetheless concluded 
that "neither retrofitting nor the creation of a monetary fund for the purpose of 
retrotitting is preventive relief permitted under R.C. 4112.052 and therefore is not 
available as a remedy in a cause of action under [that section ]."34 
280HJO REV. CODE ANN.§ 4112.052 (lexisNexis 2009). 
2~o. 08AP-250. 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 5400 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. II, 2008). 
30ld. at *12. 
31/d. at * 14 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. II , 2008) (citing Cosgrove v. Williamsburg of Cincinnati 
Mgmt. Co., 638 N.E.2d 991, 996-97 (Ohio 1994) (Resnick. J. , concurring)). 
32/d. at * 16. 
33/d. at *21. Generally speaking, retrofitting means making those stmctural modifications 
necessary to ensure that covered multifamily dwellings are readily accessible to and usable by 
persons with disabilities. 
34/d. at *27. In reaching this conclusion, the court distinguished those decisions 
interpreting a similar federal provision, 42 U.S.C. § 3614(d)(l )(A)-(B) (2000). noting that the 
remedial language in that federal provision includes not only preventative relief, but also 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss2/6
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A request that a defendant retrofit noncompliant multifamily dwellings or 
contribute to a monetary fund for that purpose, the court stated, "is in the nature of 
damages where the monetary relief is sought as redress for defendants ' alleged past 
unlawful discriminatory practices ... . "35 "The purpose of preventative rcliefl,]" 
however, ' 'is to prevent future injury, not redress past wrongs. "36 "[I]f[retrofitting or 
contributing to a monetary fu nd for the purpose of retrofitting] is not a request for 
monetary relief, [i]t is a request in the nature of a mandatory injunction, which is 
used to remedy a past injury by compelling a defendant to restore a party' s rights 
through some affinnative action.'m 
As a result, this decision stands for the perplexing proposition that the State of 
Ohio is not subject to any limitations period when it brings a civil action to protect 
fair housing rights-in particular compliance with design and construction 
requirements-pursuant to R.C. § 4112.052. This same section, however, does not 
authorize any form of retrofitting to bring multifamily dwellings into compliance, 
which the court itself recognized as "a particularly appropriate remedy to remove the 
lingering effects of past discriminatory practices that have violated the rights of 
disabled persons to accessible housing."38 
C. Standing of Fair Housing Organizations 
The most surprising of the recent decisions was issued in Fair Housing 
Advocates Association v. Chance,39 a case in which a private fair housing group filed 
a lawsuit alleging that a landlord refused to rent an apartment to a prospective tenant 
because she had too many children.411 The private fair housing group, which assists 
tenants and prospective tenants who believe they have been unfairly discriminated 
against, conducted an investigation and determined that the prospective tenant was 
discriminated against on the basis of familial status.41 The trial court granted a 
motion to dismiss the case, holding that the ptivate fai r housing group lacked 
standing.42 
On appeal. the Ninth District Court of Appeals affinned the trial court's decision. 
The appellate court held that a private fair housing group did not have standing to 
pursue a prospective tenant's familial status housing discrimination claim against a 
landlord in a civil action because the private fair housing group could not show that 
it was an ··aggrieved person.'"'3 Pursuant to R.C. § 4112.051 (A)( I), " (a]ggrieved 
'"such other relief as the court deems appropriate, including monetary damages .... " ' !d. at 
*24 (quoting § 3614(d)( I )(B)). 
35/d. at *26. 
36/d. at *27. 
37 Fairmark Dev .. Inc., 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 5400, at *27. 
JS/d. 
39No. 07CA0016, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 2210 (Ohio Ct. App.-9th Dist. June 2, 2008), 
discretionary appeal denied by 895 N.E.2d 566 (Ohio 2008). 
40/d. at* I. 
41 /d. at *1-2. 
42/d. at *2. 
43/d. at *9. 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009
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persons may enforce the rights granted by [the fair housing law] by filing a civil 
action in the court of common pleas of the county in which the alleged unlawful 
discriminatory practice occurred . . . .'""' 
In support of its opinion, the appellate court simply noted that the federal fair 
housing law, 42 U.S.C. § 3616a(c)(2), "expressly provides for private enforcement 
by 'private fair housing enforcement organizations[,]'" while Ohio law does not 
include a similar provision.45 · 'The Ohio legislature," the appellate court continued, 
"could have provided for entorcement of Ohio's Fair Housing laws by private 
enforcement agencies ... . The statutes reflect that the legislature chose a different 
method for enforcement. Accordingly, there is no need for private enforcement 
under Ohio's Fair Housing laws.'146 
There are, suflice to say, multiple problems arising from this decision. To begin 
with, it ignores the fact that state law defines the word "person" very broadly and 
includes "one or more individuals, ... associations, organizations, ... and other 
organized groups of persons."47 This, when coupled with the ordinary meaning of 
"aggrieved," would easily encompass a private fair housing organization conducting 
investigations and related activities to identify and remedy unlawful discriminatory 
housing practices. It is also inconsistent with the well-established principle under the 
federal Fair Housing Act that private fair housing organizations do have standing to 
file fair housing discrimination lawsuits,48 which in turn threatens tbe designation of 
Ohio's fair housing laws as "substantially equivalent" to federal fair housing laws 
and the federal funding made avai !able as a result of such designation. 
On a deeper level, though, it undermines those robust private enforcement actions 
resulting from the initiative and dedication of private fair housing organizations 
across the state acting as private attorneys general, actions that both supplement and 
enhance the investigations and enforcement actions undertaken by the Ohio Civil 
Rights Commission. 
D. Issuance o.lSubpoenas During the Preliminary Investigation 
While not a fair housing case, State ex rei. American Legion Post 25 v. Ohio 
Civil Rights Commission49 warrants discussion because of its impact on the 
investigative process for all civil rights cases, including fair housing investigations. 
The issue in this case was whether respondents have the right to request the issuance 
of subpoenas during the preliminary investigation-not the administrative hearing 
stage, but rather the stage at which the Ohio Civil Rights Commission seeks to 
determine only whether there is probable cause of discrimination. 5° 
440HfO REv. CODE ANN.,§ 4112.051 (A)( I) (LEXISNEXIS 2009). 
45Fair Hous. Advocates Ass'n v. Chance, No. 07CAOO I 6, 2008 Ohio App. LEX IS 22 I 0, at 
*7 (Ohio Ct. App.-9th Dist. June 2. 2008). discretionary appeal denied by 895 N.E.2d 566 
(Ohio 2008). 
"
16/d. at *8-9. 
470HJO REV. CODE ANN .. § 4112.0l(A){l) (LexisNexis 2009). 
48See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (I 982). 
"
19884 N.E.2d 589 (Ohio 2008). 
50 !d. at 592. 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss2/6
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For years the agency had taken the position that respondents can request 
subpoenas only after a formal complaint has been issued and the matter is set for a 
public hearing.51 This not only maintained the independence of the preliminary 
investigation, but also avoided unnecessa1y disruptions that unreasonably burden the 
agency as well as persons who have filed discrimination charges with the agency.52 
The Supreme Court of Ohio, however, held that the Ohio Civil Rights 
Commission is required to issue a subpoena at a respondent's request during, as well 
as after, the preliminary investigationY The statutory provision at issue, the Court 
explained, "requires the [OCRC) to issue subpoenas in a party's name ' to the same 
extent and subject to the same limitations' as those issued in the [agency's] name. 
No limitation on when the subpoena should be issued appears in the statute."54 So, 
"because the [OCRC] is entitled to issue subpoenas on its own behalf during the 
preliminary investigation of a [respondent), [the respondent) is also entitled to have 
the commission issue subpoenas on its behalf during the investigation."55 
The immediate problem with the decision in this case is that it usurps the 
authority of the Ohio Civil Rights Commission to determine the manner, method, 
and scope of its preliminary investigation. In essence, this decision has bestowed 
upon respondents the right to undertake their own preliminary investigations, to the 
same extent as, and with the same power and authority of, the Ohio Civil Rights 
Commission. This result clearly stands the neutral, independent, investigative 
procedure envisioned by the statutory framework on its head. 
The less obvious, but equally significant, problem is that this decision permits 
respondents to engage in what amounts to full discovery against any person who has 
filed any form of discrimination charge, including a housing discrimination charge. 
This full discovery is allowed even though the person who filed the charge is usually 
unrepresented and wholly unfamiliar with the formalities of subpoenas and the legal 
process in general, and more importantly. easily dissuaded from asserting or 
maintaining his or her right to be free from discriminatory practices when confronted 
with the full brunt of a respondent's independent, but legally-authorized, preliminary 
investigation. 
IV. STEPS TAKEN TO ENSURE SUBSTANTIAL EQUIVALENCY 
As a result of these decisions and the possible consequences for the continuation 
of the state's substantially equivalent designation, the Ohio Civil Rights Commission 
has taken steps to amend Ohio Revised Code Chapter 4112 to re-establish the rights 
and remedies previously believed to be available under the state's fair housing law. 
At the time of this writing, s~vcral amendments- those deemed most f1mdamental to 
51State ex rei. Am. Legion Post 25 v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 884 N.E.2d 589, 593 
(Ohio 2008); Brief of the Ohio Employment Lawyers· Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 4, Am. Leg ion Post 25. 884 N.E.21.1 589. 
s2 flrief of Respondents-Appellants at*" L3-l5, Am. Legion Post 25, 884 N.E.2d 589; State 
ex rei. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Gunn. 344 N.E.2d 327, 329-30 (Ohio 1976). 
$~Am. Legion Post 25, fHS4 !'-I.E.2d at 595. 
5~ !d. at 593-94. 
~5/d. at 593 (quoting OHIO R EV. CuP~ ANN. * 4112.04 tLexisNexis 2009)). 
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009
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substantial equivalency- have already been prepared and are beginning to make 
their way through the legislative process. 56 
For example, in response to the decision in the American Legion Post 25 case, 
the Ohio Civil Rights Commission has proposed an amendment to R.C. § 
41 12.04(8)(3 )(b) that would extend to both a charging party and a respondent the 
ability to request the issuance of a subpoena to the same extent, and subject to the 
same limitations, as a subpoena issued by the agency.5' The ability of either a 
charging party or a respondent to request a subpoena, however, would arise only 
after a finding of probable cause has been made and the matter is scheduled for a 
public hearing under R.C. § 4112.05(8); neither may request that a subpoena be 
issued during the investigation.58 This levels the playing field for all parties during 
the litigation phase, while maintaining the ability of the Ohio Civil Rights 
Commission to conduct an independent and efficient investigation. 59 
The Ohio Civil Rights Commission's proposed amendment to reverse the 
decision in the Chance case is relatively straightforward, adding a definition of 
"aggrieved person" under R.C. § 4112.0 I (A) that specifically includes private fair 
housing organizations.60 This new definition defines that term as including any 
person injured by, or who will be injured by, an unlawful discriminatory housing 
practice. as well as private nonprotit fair housing enforcement organizations or 
nonprofit groups performing investigations and enforcement activities designed to 
identify, eliminate, and remedy unlawful discriminatory housing practices.61 
Finally, the Ohio Civil Rights Commission has proposed an amendment to 
reverse the decision in the Fairmark Development case. This amendment slates that 
under R.C. § 4112.052 a court may award preventative relief, and any other order of 
reliet: including monetary reliet~ and may, to vindicate the public interest, assess a 
civil penalty (not to exceed $50,000 for a first violation, and not to exceed $100,000 
for any subsequent violation).<'~ 
50orhe amendments regarding the issuance of subpoenas and standing of fair housing 
organizations, further discussed below, arc included in H.B. I. I 28th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. 
(Ohio 2009) [hereinafter Ohio H.B. 1 ], available at http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/Bi11Text 
128/128_HB_ l_PHC_N.htmL 
"Am. Legion Post 25, 884 N.E.2d 589; Ohio H.B. l. 
580hio H.B. 1. 
59 Although not related to a court decision, the Ohio Civil Rights Commission is also 
taking steps to ensure that aggrieved persons may intervene when an election is made to have 
the alleged unlawful discriminatory housing practices covered by an administrative complaint 
addressed in a civil action pursuant to OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 41l2.05l(A)(2)(b) (Lcxis 
Nexis 2009). An amendment has been proposed specifying that an aggrieved person may 
intervene as a matter of right in a civil action commenced pursuant to an election made under 
that section. Ohio H. B. l . 
wOhio H.B. I. 
61 /d. 
62 A copy of this proposed amendment is on file in the central office of the Ohio Civil 
Rights Commission. 
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss2/6
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V. CONCLUSION 
While there is always a healthy amount of uncertainty surrounding any legislative 
effort, and the give-and-take of the political process means that even the best of 
intentions often meets strong resistance, the Ohio Civil Rights Commission remains 
optimistic that the amendments proposed in response to the decisions discussed 
herein will be enacted. These amendments, after all, seek to do nothing more than 
ensure that Ohio's fair housing law provides protections and remedies equal to (as 
opposed to less than) its federal counterpart and maintains its designation as 
·'substantially equivalent:' which is precisely the same rationale underlying the 
substantial revision of the state's fair housing law that occurred over fifteen years 
ago.63 
l>J ~I.B. 321 , I 19th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1992). See, e.g. , Ohio Civil Rights 
Commission, http://crc.ohio.gov/disc_housing.htm (last visited Mar. I 3, 2009). 
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